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I. INTRODUCTION 
The future of international climate change regulation remains un-
certain, as nations struggle to prepare an agreement that will govern obliga-
tions post-Kyoto Protocol. The negotiations at COP-15 at Copenhagen1 
revealed deep political divisions and demonstrated the changing power dy-
namics in international relations, COP-16 negotiations in Cancun2 restored 
what appeared to be a derailed international process and COP-17 negotia-
tions at Durban signaled continuing differences among nations to making 
emissions reduction an obligation, as three major signatories to the Kyoto 
Protocol—Canada, Japan, and Russia—refused to commit to a second round 
of emissions reduction obligations.3 Climate negotiations thus continue to 
expose the continuing crisis in international law. Despite efforts of several 
nations, many even sincere, it is becoming clear that the chronic illness—of 
  
  Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. The author is grateful 
to the organizers at the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center, the editors of Case West-
ern International Law Journal and particularly to Professor Michael Scharf for hosting an 
intellectually invigorating conference.  
 1 See generally Copenhagen Climate Change Conference - December 2009, U.N. Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/ 
meeting/6295.php (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (providing background information on the 
COP-15 conference). 
 2 See generally U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME: BUREAU FOR DEVELOPMENT POLICY, 
SYNTHESIS OF UNFCCC CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE IN CANCUN, MEXICO (2010) (provid-
ing a summary of COP-16 in Cancun).   
 3 Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, 16th Sess., 6, Draft Decision-/CMP-7 (advance 
unedited version), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/ 
application/pdf/awgkp_outcome.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2012); Jennifer Morgan & Edward 
Cameron, Reflections on COP 17 in Durban, WORLD RESOURCES INST. INSIGHTS (Dec. 16, 
2011), http://insights.wri.org/news/2011/12/reflections-cop-17-durban. 
File: Badrinarayana 2 Created on:  4/3/2012 9:47:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:18:00 PM 
436 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:435 
poor international law response to environmental and human rights issues—
is now approaching crisis proportions in the context of climate change. This 
thought piece identifies three overlapping areas of crises: normative, eco-
nomic order, and legitimacy. It argues that hope, the theme of this panel, in 
averting a crisis relating to climate change lies in embracing the need for a 
moral compass in addressing this incredibly complex collective action prob-
lem. 
II. THE THREE CRISES 
International legal response to climate change is at crossroads and 
the way is scattered with several problems and pitfalls. There are, however, 
three core crises that challenge the efficacy of international law and can 
potentially exacerbate the international law crisis. 
A. Normative Crisis 
Climate change threatens to devastate several nations, threatening 
their territorial integrity and domestic sustenance. For example, rising sea 
levels are predicted to eventually drown the Maldives.4 Similarly, severe 
and sudden weather conditions are predicted to devastate populations and 
property in Bangladesh.5 Both Maldives and Bangladesh are sovereign na-
tions and recognized as such by their membership in the United Nations.6 
As sovereign nations, international law implicitly and customarily recogniz-
es their right to exercise full control over their domestic affairs.7 
Their territorial integrity and the property and livelihood of their 
people are domestic concerns. Nations such as Maldives and Bangladesh are 
entitled under international law and the founding principle of sovereignty to 
exercise full control over these matters. However, when their domestic in-
terest in their territory and their people is wrecked by climate impacts 
caused primarily by activities of foreign nations,8 their sovereignty is chal-
  
 4 ORRIN H. PILKEY & ROB YOUNG, THE RISING SEA 20 (2009) (discussing the construction 
of a massive sea wall around Male, the capital city of the Maldives, to combat the heightened 
risk of flooding). 
 5 E.g., MD. SHAMSUDDOHA & REZAUL KARIM CHOWDHURY, CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT 
AND DISASTER VULNERABILITIES IN THE COASTAL AREAS OF BANGLADESH 10–17 (2007) (ex-
plaining how natural disasters and rising sea levels could negatively impact Bangladesh by 
causing loss of lives and property). 
 6 Press Release, Dep’t of Pub. Info., United Nations Member States, U.N. Press Release 
ORG/1469 (July 3, 2006) (listing the 192 Member States of the United Nations).   
 7 See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 11–22 (1999) (ex-
plaining the history of the different types of sovereignty). 
 8 See, e.g., Adam Hadhazy, The Maldives, Threatened by Drowning Due to Climate 
Change, Set to Go Carbon-Neutral, SCI. AM. (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.scientificamerican. 
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lenged. Further, to the extent that they cannot—through internal measures—
mitigate the problem, their ability to exercise their sovereign prerogatives 
has been compromised. To the extent their influence in the international 
arena is limited for lack of economic prowess, their ability to control factors 
and mitigate their loss of sovereignty is further diminished. The fate of na-
tions such as Maldives and Bangladesh and their people lies in the hands of 
a few developed countries and emerging economies. 
To date, the process of globalization notwithstanding, nations may 
not interfere with another nation’s sovereignty, unless the nation chooses to 
abdicate its sovereignty on its own volition.9 Globalization may have low-
ered national borders, but it has not eradicated these borders. So, when one 
considers the situation regarding sovereignty as it stands presently, it is evi-
dent that respect for sovereignty, per the Westphalian pact,10 must be ex-
tended to all nations recognized by the community of nations. 
The tone of international negotiations on climate change, however, 
underplays the threat that climate change presents to national sovereignty of 
these nations. In this sense, climate change showcases the normative threat 
to a fundamental precept of international law. It challenges the international 
process underlying climate change negotiations. 
B. Economic Interest Crisis 
A second crisis stems from the current global economic order. The 
end of the Cold War and the emergence of a global economic order through 
a series of trade and investment liberalization agreements has resulted in the 
emergence of new economies, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Afri-
ca (in combination referred to as BRIC or BASIC). While there are mixed 
views about the emergence of these economies and their general impact on 
local economies and social conditions, those issues are not discussed here. 
The focus here is on the ultimate consequence of the emergence of these 
  
com/blog/post.cfm?id=maldives-drowning-carbon-neutral-by-2009-03-16 (noting that be-
cause of the fear of rising sea levels, the Maldives plan to go carbon-neutral).   
 9 See, e.g., Ruwantissa Abeyratne, What Really Is State Sovereignty?, Sri Lanka Guardian 
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2011/10/what-really-is-state-sovereignty. 
html ( “Sovereignty in international law is the right to exercise the functions of a State to the 
exclusion of all other States in regard to a certain area of the world.”). 
 10 See Jan Aart Scholte, Civil Society and Sovereignty in a Post-Statist Circumstance, in 
RE-ENVISIONING SOVEREIGNTY: THE END OF WESTPHALIA? 331, 345 (Trudy Jacobsen et al. 
eds., 2008) (explaining how the Westphalian Pact enabled democratic sovereign states to 
guarantee their democratic credentials); Daniel Philpott, Westphalia, Authority, and Interna-
tional Society, in SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MILLENNIUM 144, 160 (Robert Jackson ed., 3rd ed. 
1999) (“Westphalia remains the most significant resolution in sovereignty to date. It revised 
all three facets of authority, and established constitutional authority in the form of the sover-
eign states system.”). 
File: Badrinarayana 2 Created on:  4/3/2012 9:47:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:18:00 PM 
438 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 44:435 
nations as key players in the global economy on climate change negotia-
tions.  
Since these nations are shaping their economies on highly carbon-
intensive growth models, since their historic contribution to emissions is 
low, and since they are unwilling to sacrifice their opportunity for develop-
ment, the essence of climate negotiations lies in balancing economic inter-
ests of nations. Developed countries have been focused therefore on finding 
solutions that will strike the delicate balance between economic interests 
and interests in mitigating climate change. To be sure, climate change—if 
unmitigated—can also affect economic interests, but instead of motivating 
action, mixed evaluations have resulted in some nations resisting emissions 
reduction obligations, instead of increased efforts to reduce emissions. No-
tably, larger emitters such as China and the U.S. have resisted binding emis-
sions obligations.11 
The influence of such economic self-interest on international legal 
obligations mirrors the problems of another era of “globalization,” when the 
influence of the British Empire spanned the globe.12 Nations now, as then, 
are focused on the economic and power-related aspects, sometimes to the 
detriment of their own citizens. At the height of the British Empire, not only 
was there unrest in Britain’s colonies, but, in Britain, there were those that 
also lost their employment and thus did not benefit from the Empire’s eco-
nomic growth.13  
The current quest for economic growth by emerging economies 
overshadows other equally important human interests, even in their own 
countries. For example, India is an emerging economy whose citizens are 
consistently listed among the most vulnerable populations to climate change 
impacts.14 Yet the Indian government is pursuing policies that favor eco-
nomic growth and non-legal intervention in its climate policies over other 
property and livelihood-related interests of its citizens.15 More generally, 
  
 11 Peter H. Koehn, Underneath Kyoto: Emerging Subnational Government Initiatives and 
Incipient Issue-Bundling Opportunities in China and the United States, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL. 
POLITICS 53, 55 (2008).  
 12 See generally 4 EDGAR SANDERSON, THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 
(London, Blackie & Son, Ltd. 1897) (providing a history of the lives of British citizens 
around the world during the 1800s).   
 13 See 1 id. at 222 (London, Blackie & Son, Ltd. 1897) (describing the food shortages 
affecting British citizens in Canada before and during the colonization period).  
 14 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Climate Change: Im-
pacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing Countries, 20–24 (2007) (noting that 
India is susceptible to flooding, erosion, mudslides and epidemics of malaria, dengue, and 
other vector-borne diseases during the wet season).   
 15 See Namrata Patodia Rastogi, Winds of Change: India’s Emerging Climate Strategy, 46 
INT’L SPECTATOR 127, 127 (2011) (shifting climate policies in India must not be implement-
ed at the expense of economic growth and development). 
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polices pursued by emerging economies and developed countries generally 
present near-insurmountable problems to other nations, particularly in the 
sub-Saharan region. 
C. Legitimacy Crisis: Climate Change and Adaptation Strategies 
The third crisis lies in the legitimacy of international response to 
climate change, particularly with respect to adaptation. The question of le-
gitimacy in international law scholarship has received considerable attention 
in different contexts. Legitimacy is seen as an essential component of inter-
national law, as a reason why nations comply with international law16 and as 
a tool to increase the efficacy of international organizations.17  
Whatever view one takes of legitimacy, there is presently a legiti-
macy crisis with respect to climate change, which is particularly evident in 
efforts to fund mitigation and adaptation efforts. In an effort to assist devel-
oping nations to adapt to climate change and to collect related data, negotia-
tors established a series of financial mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, 
which was operationalized in later meetings.18 The disbursement of these 
funds, however, falls short of legitimacy standards for several reasons.  
First, the structure for allocating funds is complex, and barring least 
developed countries, the allocation for developing countries is checkered.19 
Second, the disbursement of funds is governed by multilateral banks, which 
has resulted in conflict regarding rules governing disbursement and poor 
participation by the recipient nation in the project selection process.20 Thus, 
rather than countries identifying projects and receiving funds, donor institu-
tions select projects and countries.21 Third, international organizations that 
  
 16 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712 
(1988) (describing how the components of legitimacy influence states). 
 17 See Daniel M. Bodansky, The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law 2 (Univ. 
Georgia Sch. Law, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-013, 2008), available at http://pap 
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1033542##. 
 18 E.g., Adaptation Fund, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_ 
mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/3659.php (last updated Dec. 21, 2011) (describing the 
establishment of the Adaptation Fund, an important financial mechanism supervised and 
managed by the Adaptation Fund Board, with the purpose to review submission requests for 
funding).   
 19 See generally Adaptation Fund Board, Initial Funding Priorities, Nov. 16–18, 2009, 
U.N. Doc. AFB/B.8/7/Rev.1 (Oct. 29, 2009) (listing the Adaptation Fund’s goals for re-
source allocation decisions).   
 20 See generally INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., TRUST FUND SUPPORT FOR DEVELOPMENT: AN 
EVALUATION OF THE WORLD BANK’S TRUST FUND PORTFOLIO 110 (2011) (outlining the ways 
the World Bank serves the Global Environment Facility (GEF)).   
 21 See, e.g., Adaptation Fund Board, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support 
/financial_mechanism/adaptation_fund/items/4264.php (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (listing 
the functions of the Adaptation Fund Board).   
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disburse the funds, such as the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), have 
applied their own governing rules for providing aid and therefore, required 
developing nations to propose projects that bear “global benefits” and not 
only “local benefits.”22 Such requirements are prima facie illegitimate,23 
especially when one considers that these countries are paying the price for a 
problem that was caused by a few countries that were pursuing developing 
activities for their national benefit. Fourth, even though nations recently 
pledged $100 billion per year starting in 2020, for both mitigation and adap-
tation activities, it is unclear whether and how these nations are going to 
meet their goals.24  
To be fair, since the COP-16 meeting in Cancun and the COP-17 
meeting in Durban, efforts are underway to reduce discrepancies in the fi-
nancing system. A special committee, comprised of developing countries’ 
representatives, that was established at COP-16 to create a more transparent 
system for fund disbursement25 provided its first report in Durban.26 The 
governance mechanism, however, requires fine-tuning. Even if a more 
transparent and balanced system is eventually established, the management 
of internal problems, such as corruption and unaccountable domestic admin-
istration of funds, will require close international scrutiny.  
Missteps in the generation and administration of vast amounts of 
funds will mean further weakening of legitimacy of the international legal 
order governing climate change. This legitimacy concern represents a loom-
ing crisis, because failure to properly manage funds could devastate na-
tions—both donors and recipients—even if for different reasons. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The three crises discussed briefly in this thought piece can be mean-
ingfully addressed by nations. However, to do so, nations must consider the 
fundamental purpose of not only international law, but law itself. Even if 
  
 22 See Nicholas Van Praag, The Global Environment Facility: Instrument Establishing, 33 
I.L.M. 1273, 1286 (1994) (outlining the way funds are allocated and trustee responsibilities); 
see also Sophie Smyth, Collective Action For Development Finance, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 
961, 993 (addressing NGO concerns with the World Bank’s role in financing projects).   
 23 DEV. CTR. OF THE ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., FINANCING DEVELOPMENT 
2008:  WHOSE OWNERSHIP? 12 (2008) (“[E]xternally imposed democratic processes may be 
regarded as an illegitimate interference by donors in national affairs.”).     
 24 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Group 
on Climate Change Financing 3, U.N. Doc. 10-63081 (Nov. 5, 2010). 
 25 See RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE FINANCING: THE GREEN 
CLIMATE FUND (GCF) 6 (2011) (stipulating the terms of the formation of the Transitional 
Committee).   
 26 Green Climate Fund, Rep. of the Transitional Committee, 17th Sess., annex II, Draft 
decision-/CP.17 (advanced unedited version) (on file with author). 
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technically and mechanically achievable, the separation of morality from 
law is in many ways central to the present crisis in international law regard-
ing climate change. If one is to hope that crises will provide opportunities to 
be innovative and courageous, one must equally hope that at least a loose 
sense of justice enters the negotiations. 
By not carefully considering the different interests of citizens in 
discussing emissions reductions, states have obscured the impact of funda-
mentally changed nature of this global society in addressing global collec-
tive problems. Disparities within nations are now echoed across nations—
winners and losers can be found both in developed and developing nations. 
Thus, even if a few wealthy countries may have contributed to the problem 
initially, not all citizens within developed countries engage in highly car-
bon-intensive activities. Similarly, not all citizens in emerging economies 
pursue a low-carbon intensive lifestyle. These disparities call for more in-
novative solutions within the domestic context and must be supported 
through international efforts. At this point, if one has to be hopeful about the 
role of international law in addressing climate change, one must be guided 
as much by moral compunctions as by any other alleged self-interest. 
 
